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Apprendi	in	this	context	reflects	not	just	respect	for	longstanding	precedent,	but	the	need	to	give	
intelligible	content	to	the	right	of	jury	trial.’	
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Innocence	and	guilt	vs.	more	and	less	punishment	
So	far	the	argument	suggests	that	if	the	fear	of	giving	punishment	we	should	not	give	is	what	
justifies	the	presumption	of	innocence,	then	we	need	to	be	as	careful	not	to	punish	more	than	
we	should	as	we	are	not	to	punish	when	we	should	not.	In	order	to	argue	against	this,	
someone	could	simply	deny	that	the	direct	moral	grounding	is	the	right	way	to	understand	the	
justification	for	or	value	of	the	PIP,	or	even	deny	that	the	PIP	standard	is	the	right	standard	to	
have	in	a	criminal	trial.14	These	responses	may	be	right	–	I	think	we	need	greater	philosophical	
reflection	on	the	purpose	and	grounding	of	the	PIP	–	but	I	am	going	to	set	them	to	one	side	
here.	After	all,	my	thesis	is	a	conditional	one,	based	on	the	(commonly	used)	direct	moral	
grounding.	(However,	even	though	I	am	accepting,	arguendo,	the	direct	moral	grounding,	the	
argument	here	nevertheless	contributes	to	the	assessment	of	the	adequacy	of	the	direct	moral	
grounding,	for	we	are	in	a	position	to	fully	evaluate	that	way	of	grounding	the	PIP	only	once	
we	fully	understand	its	ramifications	for	all	stages	of	the	criminal	justice	process.)	
	
If	an	adherent	of	(something	like)	the	direct	moral	grounding	wanted	to	block	its	apparent	
ramifications	for	Stages	1.ii	and	3	of	the	criminal	justice	system,	the	most	obvious	strategy	
would	be	to	point	to	important	differences	between	the	decision	made	at	Stage	2	(conviction)	
and	those	that,	together,	decide	how	much	to	punish	offenders.	The	main	difference	is	that	
what	we	decide	at	Stage	2	(and,	indeed,	Stage	1.i)	is	whether	to	declare	someone	a	criminal	
and	render	them	liable	to	punishment,	whilst	at	Stages	1.ii	and	3	we	decide	how	much	to	
punish	–	whether	to	punish	more	or	less.	Therefore,	the	decision	we	protect	with	the	
presumption	of	innocence	is	a	modal	one	(whether	the	person	be	branded	guilty	or	not)	whilst	
those	we	are	considering	here	are	of	degree.	
	
Why	should	this	matter?	Ultimately	the	direct	moral	grounding	seems	to	instruct	us	to	err	on	
the	side	of	caution	–	to	prefer	under-punishment	to	over-punishment.	Punishing	the	innocent	
and	punishing	too	much	are	both	instances	of	inappropriate	punishment.	One	reason	we	
might	see	an	important	difference	is	that,	as	I	have	observed	from	the	outset,	the	guilty,	of	
course,	(once	found	guilty)	have	no	right	to	be	presumed	innocent.	The	presumption	of	
innocence	may	be	more	than	an	epistemic	starting	point	we	instruct	juries	to	adopt	–	it	may	
be	also	reveal	a	condition	on	which	our	concerns	about	and	protections	against	inappropriate	
punishment	are	based.	Our	fears	may	not	be	of	inappropriate	punishment	tout	court,	but	
rather	a	specific	incidence	of	inappropriate	punishment	–	punishing	the	innocent.	In	other	
																																								 																				
14	For	a	provocative	utilitarian	argument	along	these	lines,	see	Laudan	2011.	
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words,	the	guilty	not	only	have	no	right	to	be	presumed	innocent,	we	ought	to	be	less	troubled	
by	the	idea	of	punishing	them	inappropriately.	
	
One	reason	this	might	be	the	case	is	that	once	we	know	you	to	be	guilty,	you	lose	the	status	
required	for	us	to	be	worried	about	mistreating	you	through	the	medium	of	punishment	(or	
your	status	is	this	sense	is	considered	lesser).	Yet	surely	we	insist	that	each	charge	against	a	
person	be	proven	beyond	all	reasonable	doubt,	even	after	they	have	been	found	guilty	of	one	
crime.	Imagine	Nina	is	charged	with	two	murders.	Now	imagine	that	she	is	found	guilty	of	the	
first.	Should	we	retain	the	presumption	of	innocence	and	beyond	reasonable	doubt	standard	
for	establishing	whether	she	committed	the	second	crime?	Yes.	Given	this,	it	can’t	be	that	just	
because	we	know	Nina	is	a	criminal	then	she	has	lost	status,	making	us	less	worried	about	
inappropriately	punishing	her.	The	argument	that	we	should	be	less	worried	about	
inappropriately	punishing	the	guilty	cannot	be	based	on	loss	of	status,	otherwise	we	would	be	
comfortable	with	a	lower	standard	at	trial	for	those	already	found	guilty	of	one	crime.	
	
Another	way	that	the	binary	choice	of	guilty	or	not	guilty	might	be	importantly	different	from	
the	scalar	decision	of	how	much	to	punish	is	to	do	with	censure.15	Criminal	law	theorists	often	
point	to	the	concept	of	censure	to	explain	what	is	distinctive	about	the	criminal	law,	and	
therefore	it	may	be	important	in	justifying	the	distinctive	procedural	protections	that	come	
with	that	area	of	law.	In	the	decisions	taken	at	Stages	1.i	and	2,	the	question	concerns	whether	
a	type	of	conduct	or	a	particular	person	ought	to	be	censured.	But	in	tariff-setting	and	
sentencing	decisions	we	have	already	decided	that	the	conduct	or	person	ought	to	be	
censured.	That	key	decision	has	been	made.	Now	(an	argument	might	go)	we	are	only	
deciding	how	much	hard	treatment	those	who	are	shown	to	have	acted	in	the	prohibited	way	
should	get.	And	since	censure	is	what	is	special	about	the	criminal	law,	and	it	is	inappropriate	
censure	not	hard	treatment	that	we	fear	(as	evidenced	by	our	comfort	in	distributing	hard	
treatment	on	the	basis	of	a	balance	of	probabilities	standard	in	the	civil	law),	then	we	can	
worry	less	about	errors	in	these	kinds	of	decisions.	The	question	of	censure	is	no	longer	a	live	
one.16	
	
																																								 																				
15	I	am	grateful	to	Lucia	Zedner	and	Mike	Redmayne	for	discussion	here.	
16	This	would	avoid	the	Nina	counter-example,	since	the	question	asked	at	trial	would	be	‘should	we	
censure	Nina	for	this	crime?’	and	so	she	should	be	equally	protected	against	inappropriate	censure	at	
each	trial.	
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To	back	up	this	thought,	we	can	distinguish	between	conviction	and	a	decision	to	punish.	
Thus	far,	I	have	written	as	if	what	worries	us	about	the	decision	to	convict	is	that	we	might	
inappropriately	punish.	However,	not	every	conviction	leads	to	punishment,	and	yet	we	think	
that	every	conviction	decision	should	be	protected	by	the	PIP.	This	may	suggest	that	it	is	not	
punishment	that	worries	us,	but	conviction.	Why	should	we	worry	about	conviction	but	not,	
to	the	same	extent,	about	punishment?	The	only	plausible	answer	seems	to	be	that	it	is	
conviction	that	carries	the	censure	of	the	community.	
	
There	are	two	problems	with	such	an	argument.	The	first	is	that	it	fully	distinguishes	the	
censure	and	hard	treatment	elements	of	punishment,	seeing	censure	purely	as	something	we	
do	or	don’t	do,	and	as	delivered	purely	through	conviction,	and	hard	treatment	as	an	
independent	imposition,	of	which	we	may	give	more	or	less.	However,	in	reality	censure	(a)	is	
delivered	through	hard	treatment,	and,	consequently,	(b)	is	not	simply	either	delivered	or	not.	
We	censure	murderers	more	than	we	do	litterers,	and	we	do	so	precisely	by	giving	them	more	
hard	treatment	than	litterers.	Given	this,	censure	goes	along	with	hard	treatment,	and	so	
censure	is	still	a	live	issue	in	sentencing	and	tariff-setting	decisions.	
	
Secondly,	while	the	division	between	‘no	censure’/non-criminal	to	‘some	censure’/criminal	
may	be	a	very	important	one,	it	is	intuitively	implausible	to	suggest	that	censuring	somebody	
who	should	not	be	censured	is	always	a	worse	error	than	censuring	somebody	too	much.	
Consider	innocent	people	who	are	fined	minor	amounts	in	criminal	law	courts.	They	are	
publicly	censured,	and	are	given	very	little	hard	treatment.	Now	think	of	the	person	given	a	
long	prison	sentence	after	being	(rightly)	convicted	of	littering.	This	second	error	is	far	more	
serious	than	the	first	–	even	though	some	censure	is	appropriate.	Given	this,	the	no	
censure/some	censure	line	cannot	be	all	that	matters,	and	even	if	it	needs	more	protection,	
similar	protection	ought	to	be	offered	against	mistakes	of	degree.	
	
It	is	also,	I	think,	implausible	to	think	that	inappropriate	conviction	is	feared	purely	because	it	
carries	inappropriate	censure	(as	defined	independently	of	punishment).	Conviction’s	status	as	
the	gateway	to	punishment	surely	plays	a	huge	role	in	its	normative	status	and,	consequently,	
the	need	to	protect	the	innocent	from	it.	
	
Another	thought,	along	similar	lines,	is	that	the	error	of	giving	too	much	punishment,	per	unit	
of	punishment,	decreases	as	the	level	of	punishment	increases.	So,	giving	501	units	of	
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punishment	when	500	should	have	been	given,	whilst	being	the	same	kind	of	error,	is	not	an	
error	of	the	same	magnitude	as	giving	one	unit	when	zero	units	should	have	been	given,	nor	
giving	eleven	units	when	ten	units	should	have	been	given.	Call	this	the	diminishing	marginal	
significance	of	over-punishment.	This	may	well	be	correct	–	it	seems	intuitively	plausible	–	but	
there	are	two	things	to	say	to	such	an	argument	pressed	against	my	thesis	here.	Firstly,	this	
would	suggest	that	while	we	can	be	more	comfortable	with	errors	in	sentencing	than	errors	in	
conviction,	at	the	least	we	need	a	sliding	scale	of	protection,	and	at	the	lower	levels	of	
punishments,	these	would	need	to	be	almost	the	same	as	the	trial	standard.	
	
Secondly,	while	the	diminishing	marginal	significance	of	over-punishment	seems	plausible,	so	
does	the	diminishing	marginal	significance	of	punishment.	It	may	well	be	the	case	that	you	
wrong	someone	less	by	giving	them	501	days	in	jail	rather	than	500	than	you	do	by	giving	them	
one	day	in	jail	when	you	should	give	them	zero.	But	it	is	more	important	to	punish	someone	
who	ought	to	be	punished	than	it	is	to	punish	someone	to	exactly	the	right	amount.	In	
recognising	the	importance	of	the	moral	line	between	guilt	and	innocence,	my	imaginary	
interlocutor	should	also	recognise	that	it	is	not	only	more	important	to	keep	the	innocent	on	
that	side	of	the	line,	but	also	to	get	the	guilty	over	it.	So,	at	the	higher	levels	of	punishment,	
not	only	are	the	errors	less	serious,	but	the	countervailing	considerations	in	favour	of	more	
punishment	(whether	retributive	or	deterrence-based)	also	seem	less	important.	Thus,	we	
should	expect	to	see	the	balance	of	reasons,	currently	highly	in	favour	of	under-punishment	
and	against	risking	over-punishment,	stay	in	roughly	the	same	place.	
	
Fair	warning	
I	would	argue	that	a	more	important	difference	between	conviction	decisions	and	quantity	of	
punishment	decisions,	and	one	more	likely	to	protect	tariff-setting	and	sentencing	decisions	
from	the	ramifications	that	a	direct	moral	grounding	of	the	PIP	seems	to	suggest,	concerns	fair	
warning.	Those	who	are	wrongly	convicted	didn’t	do	what	they	are	alleged	to	have	done.	
Those	who	are	punished	too	much	did	do	what	they	are	alleged	to	have	done,	and,	in	a	
country	within	which	rule	of	law	principles	are	adhered	to,	were	forewarned	that	their	
conduct	was	illegal	and	would	be	met	with	this	level	of	censure	and	sanction.	
	
Why	should	‘fair	warning’	make	overly	harsh	punishment	less	troubling?	It	cannot	simply	be	
that	the	people	were	forewarned:	telling	people	you	are	going	to	treat	them	unjustly	before	
you	do	it	is,	in	and	of	itself,	of	no	moral	significance.	(Consider	a	James	Bond	baddy	who	
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explains	to	his	victims	what	he	is	going	to	do	and	then	does	it.	This	is	morally	no	better	than	
just	doing	it).	The	important	difference	appears	to	be	that	those	who	are	rightly	convicted	but	
unjustly	punished	were	given	an	opportunity	to	avoid	the	conduct	which	has	landed	them	in	
trouble,	whilst	those	who	are	wrongly	convicted	are	not.	
	
I	certainly	think	this	opportunity	to	avoid	makes	an	important	difference	to	our	judgement	of	
the	person	who	is	punished.	The	person	has	been	foolish	or	imprudent	–	they	end	up	getting	
punished	when	they	could	have	avoided	this	punishment.	But	does	it	make	a	difference	to	our	
judgement	of	the	punisher’s	actions,	or	the	moral	badness	or	wrongness	of	the	over-
punishment?	Does	the	imprudent	behaviour	of	the	criminal	make	the	(ex	hypothesi	unjust)	
punishment	less	troubling	or	less	unjust?	I	am	not	sure	that	it	does.	Consider	this	example.	Ian	
is	confronted	by	a	highwayman.	The	highwayman,	as	is	customary,	offers	Ian	a	choice:	‘your	
money	or	your	life’.	Ian	refuses	to	give	his	money.	The	highwayman	kills	him.	Now,	Ian	has	
certainly	been	foolish,	in	a	way	that	someone	who	is	the	victim	of	an	ordinary	murder	is	not.	
But	does	this	make	Ian’s	killing	less	morally	troubling?	Can	Ian’s	imprudent	behaviour	make	
the	killing	somehow	less	unjust?	The	answer	would	seem	to	be	‘no’.	The	threat	was	an	unjust	
threat,	and	while	the	person	reacted	in	a	foolish	way	to	the	unjust	threat,	this	does	not	change	
the	fact	that	they	were	given	an	unjust	option	set.	
	
Of	course,	there	are	various	important	differences	between	Ian’s	case	and	the	case	of	someone	
who	acts	in	a	(justly)	criminalised	way,	but	is	given	a	prior	threat	of	unjust	over-punishment.	
Ian	has	a	right	to	act	in	the	way	he	does,	even	though	it	is	foolish,	whilst	the	person	who	fails	
to	respond	to	just	criminalisation	coupled	with	unjust	threats	of	punishment	has	no	such	
right.	But	the	person	does	have	a	right	not	to	be	threatened	with	that	–	the	threat	remains	
unjust.	Another	important	difference	is	that	the	highwayman	intentionally	makes	an	unjust	
threat,	and	intentionally	kills	Ian,	whereas	the	state	does	not	intentionally	over-punish	–	it	
does	so	because	of	moral	or	empirical	errors.	Regardless	of	these	important	differences,	the	
example	shows	that	foolishness	in	the	face	of	an	opportunity	to	avoid	some	conduct	does	not	
in	and	of	itself	seem	to	make	an	unjust	threat	based	on	that	conduct	less	unjust,	or	its	being	
carried	out	less	morally	problematic.	
	
Those	who	advocate	fair	warning/opportunity	to	avoid	as	marking	an	important	moral	
difference	between	incorrect	conviction	decisions	and	unjust	punishments	presumably	do	not	
think	of	fair	warning/opportunity	to	avoid	as	being	all	that	matters.	It	is,	after	all,	in	Andrew	
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Ashworth’s	words,	‘the	social	and	legal	consequences	of	being	convicted	of	a	crime’	(Ashworth	
2006,	83)	that	explain	why	the	PIP	is	so	important.	Therefore,	if	we	wish	to	accord	reasonable	
avoidability	(or	the	lack	thereof)	a	central	place	in	the	justification	of	the	PIP	then	it	must	be	
that	the	stringent	epistemic	conditions	of	the	PIP	apply	at	Stage	2	of	the	criminal	justice	
process	because	there	the	person	who	didn’t	do	it	is	threatened	with	unjust	punishment	which	
they	did	not	have	the	opportunity	to	avoid,	whilst	those	who	did	will	be	punished	justly	for	
something	they	had	the	opportunity	to	avoid.	So	it	is	the	combination	of	unjust	punishment	
and	the	failure	to	provide	opportunity	to	avoid	that	makes	the	errors	of	conviction	particularly	
serious.	
	
If	this	is	the	case,	further	work	would	need	to	establish,	firstly,	how	inappropriate	punishment	
and	opportunity	to	avoid	relate	and,	secondly,	how	we	ought	to	weigh	the	two	kinds	of	
mistake	–	just	how	important	is	reasonable	avoidability	compared	with	disproportionate	
punishment?	
	
Before	going	on	to	make	some	observations	concerning	both	of	these	issues,	I	would	first	like	
to	note	that	if	it	is	accepted	that	the	lack	of	reasonable	avoidability	provides	some	of	the	
justification	of	the	PIP,	none	of	this	threatens	my	(weaker)	conclusion	that	the	grounds	of	the	
PIP	can	tell	us	something	about	how	we	ought	to	treat	the	guilty	–	if	the	fear	of	unjust	
punishment	plays	any	role,	then	it	ought	to	play	a	similar	role	in	figuring	how	much	
punishment	to	distribute.	In	addition,	I	think	that	the	discussion	here	helps	illustrate	how	
thinking	about	what	the	direct	moral	grounding	of	the	PIP	can	tell	us	about	other	areas	of	the	
criminal	justice	process	helps	us	think	through	whether	we	wish	to	endorse	the	direct	moral	
grounding	in	the	first	place,	and,	if	we	do,	how	best	to	develop	it.	For	example,	by	thinking	
about	whether	and	how	the	direct	moral	grounding	directs	us	in	our	treatment	of	the	guilty,	
the	question	of	what	role,	and	how	important,	the	lack	of	reasonable	avoidability	is	in	
justifying	the	PIP	becomes	more	vivid.	
	
To	turn	our	attention	back	to	the	question	of	how	reasonable	avoidability	and	unjust	
punishment	relate,	there	seem	to	be	three	possible	relations:	
1. Reasonable	avoidability	is	a	necessary	condition	of	just	punishment17;	
2. Reasonable	avoidability	is	an	element	of	just	punishment	–	it	contributes	to	the	
justness	of	some	punishment;	
																																								 																				
17	For	an	argument	against	this	stance,	see	C.H.	Wellman’s	example	of	Nazi	war	criminals	in	Wellman	
2012,	388.	
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3. Reasonable	avoidability	is	a	separate	consideration	from	the	justness	of	
punishment.	
	
Both	of	the	first	two	possible	relationships	make	reasonable	avoidability	part	of	the	justness	of	
punishment.	Seeing	things	in	one	of	these	ways	seems	to	put	us	in	a	position	whereby	the	
error	of	incorrect	conviction	is	objectionable	because	of	concerns	about	unjust	punishment,	
and	part	of	that	injustice	is	explained	by	the	lack	of	opportunity	to	avoid.	But	this	makes	
failure	to	provide	the	opportunity	to	avoid	punishment	the	same	kind	of	error	as	punishing	
when	we	ought	not	to	punish,	or	punishing	too	much	–	unjust	(undeserved,	for	example)	
punishment	is	what	we	fear,	and	failure	to	provide	opportunity	to	avoid	is	but	one	way	in	
which	a	person	may	come	to	experience	the	badness	or	wrongness	of	unjust	punishment.	
	
If	this	is	the	case,	our	argument	here	remains	intact	–	the	direct	moral	grounding	tells	us	that	
we	morally-speaking	ought	to	prefer	not	giving	unjust	punishment	over	giving	just	
punishment,	and	since	over-punishment	is	a	kind	of	unjust	punishment,	we	ought	to	be	very	
careful	not	to	deliver	it.	Only	if	lack	of	fair	warning	is	a	distinctive	kind	of	wrongness	can	it	
play	a	distinctive	role	in	the	justification	of	the	PIP,	and	one	that	is	not	present	in	the	case	of	
tariff-setting	and	sentencing	decisions.	
	
If	the	relationship	is	to	be	understood	in	this	way	then	this	raises	the	question	of	how	
important	lack	of	fair	warning	can	be,	compared	to	other	kinds	of	wronging.	Consider	this	
example:	people	who	are	over-punished	by	being	sentenced	to	death,	or	given	long	prison	
sentences,	for	littering.	These	people	suffer	a	massive	injustice,	even	though	they	were	
forewarned	of	it.	I	think	these	punishments	represent	more	serious	wrongs	than	fining	
someone	£20	for	littering	even	if	they	were	not	forewarned.	Opportunity	to	avoid	may	be	
important,	but	it	doesn’t	seem	to	me	to	be	the	only	thing,	or	even	the	most	important	thing,	
in	judging	whether	and	how	much	someone	has	been	wronged	by	some	punishment.	
	
Finally,	to	further	consider	what	work	fair	warning	can	do	in	splitting	apart	conviction	
decisions	from	punishment	decisions,	consider	this	from	the	two	perspectives	from	which	
punishment	decisions	are	made.	Judges	are	to	sentence	people	within	a	range	of	punishments	
of	which	they	were	given	fair	warning.	But	note	that	they	were	given	fair	warning	of	a	range,	
and	the	question	the	judge	must	answer	is	what	punishment	to	distribute	within	that	range.	
This	makes	the	role	of	fair	warning	complex.	In	some	sense,	the	criminal	was	given	fair	
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warning,	but	in	another,	and	in	the	sense	in	which	the	judge	has	to	make	the	decision,	they	
were	not:	they	were	not	told	where	in	the	range	their	punishment	would	sit.	And	since	it	is	
this	that	the	judge	must	decide,	the	judge,	perhaps,	cannot	think	of	the	person	as	having	been	
forewarned	in	the	relevant	sense.	
	
Now	consider	the	legislature.	The	legislature	does	not	have	an	individual	person	in	front	of	it,	
whom	it	can	say	has	been	forewarned.	Rather,	the	legislature’s	role	is	to	decide	what	
forewarnings,	what	threats,	it	ought	to	issue.	Everyone	will	therefore	be	forewarned.	The	
legislature	must	balance	the	goodness	that	can	come	through	its	warnings	and	punishments	
(retributive	or	deterrent)	against	the	risk	of	unjust	threats	and	punishments.	As	far	as	fair	
warning	is	concerned,	all	is	equal.	But	the	threat	of	unjust	punishment	remains.	It	must	decide	
what	to	warn	of	–	the	legislature	is	the	highwayman	here.	Therefore,	fair	warning	seems	
something	of	a	red	herring	from	this	ex	ante	perspective.	
	
An	argument	for	abolition?	
Is	this	an	argument	for	abolitionism?18	I	don’t	think	it	need	be.	At	its	most	mild,	the	thesis	
simply	says	that	the	direct	moral	grounding	of	the	presumption	of	innocence,	if	correct,	tells	
us	that	similar	concerns	ought	to	fuel	protections	for	those	who	have	been	found	guilty.	At	its	
most	extreme,	the	thesis	says	that	legislatures	and	judges	must	be	sure	beyond	reasonable	
doubt	that	their	punishments	are	not	overly	harsh.	Why	should	we	think	that	this	could	lead	
us	to	an	argument	for	abolitionism?	My	argument	here	relies	on	there	being	uncertainty	and	
disagreement	as	to	the	appropriate	level	of	punishment	for	a	given	offence	or	offender.	Some	
think	this	leads	directly	to	abolitionism.	Consider	the	following	argument,	adapted	from	one,	
specifically	aimed	at	retributivists,	made	by	Greg	Roebuck	and	David	Wood	(2011):	
1. It	is	impermissible	to	punish	someone	disproportionately;	
2. Due	to	moral	uncertainty	and	disagreement,	we	cannot	be	sure	that	our	
punishments	are	proportionate;	
Therefore		
3. We	should	not	punish.	
	
1.	gets	off	the	ground	when	we	think	of	intentionally	or	knowingly	punishing	someone	too	
much.	In	ordinary	circumstances,	this	will	be	impermissible.	However,	it	does	not	follow	from	
the	fact	that	it	is	impermissible	to	intentionally	bring	about	an	outcome	that	it	is	
																																								 																				
18	I	am	grateful	to	Doug	Husak	for	encouraging	me	to	address	this	question.	
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impermissible	to	risk	bringing	it	about.	For	example,	it	would	clearly	be	impermissible	to	
intentionally	run	over	a	child	in	your	car,	but	it	does	not	follow	from	this	that	it	is	
impermissible	to	drive,	even	though	driving	creates	a	risk	of	running	people	over.	
	
Consider	the	factually	innocent.	Again,	in	ordinary	circumstances,	it	will	be	impermissible	to	
intentionally	and/or	knowingly	punish	the	innocent.	At	the	least,	there	is	something	
regrettable	about	doing	so	that	is	not	present	when	we	intentionally	punish	the	factually	
guilty	(proportionately).	However,	if	we	were	concerned	about	never	punishing	the	innocent,	
we	would	have	no	punishment,	since	any	punishment	system	risks	punishing	the	innocent.	
Yet	rather	than	seeing	this	risk	as	a	reason	to	abolish	punishment,	we	are	prepared	to	risk	
some	non-intentional	unjust	punishment	in	order	to	secure	some	of	the	goods	of	just	
punishment.	I	don’t	think	retributivists	(or	anyone	else)	are	necessarily	committed	to	1.	in	the	
way	that	Roebuck	and	Wood	claim	they	are.	This	is	because	Roebuck	and	Wood	don’t	appear	
to	observe	the	distinction	between	objective	and	subjective	normative	claims,	and	make	the	
jump	from	something	being	objectively	objectionable	or	impermissible	to	risking	such	an	
outcome	being	subjectively	impermissible	under	conditions	of	uncertainty.	Retributivism	
claims	that	it	is	objectively	wrong	or	bad	to	punish	the	innocent,	or	to	punish	people	too	
much,	but	it	does	not	follow	that	it	is	always	subjectively	all-things-considered	wrong	to	do	so	
(or	risk	doing	so)	–	we	need	to	know	how	to	balance	different	risks.	Only	if	the	badness	or	
wrongness	of	undeserved	punishment	infinitely	outweighs	or	completely	overrides	the	goods	
of	deserved	or	appropriate	punishments	should	retributivists	accept	this	abolitionist	
conclusion.	Given	that	retributivists	generally	support	the	PIP	but	do	not	support	
abolitionism,	they	seem	to	accept	some	risk	of	unjust	punishment,	and	thus	deny	the	
subjective	position	that	Roebuck	and	Wood	suggest	they	accept.	Thus	I	don’t	think	people	are	
committed	to	1.	in	the	way	that	Roebook	and	Wood	need	them	to	be	for	their	argument	to	go	
through.19	
	
Therefore,	the	question	is:	how	much	risk	should	we	accept?	Let’s	say	that	the	more	extreme	
conclusion	of	the	argument	presented	here	is	true	–	that	we	ought	not	to	punish	unless	we’re	
sure	beyond	reasonable	doubt	that	we	are	not	punishing	too	much.	Whilst	Roebuck	and	
Wood	may	be	wrong	that	(subjectively	speaking)	it	is	always	(all-things-considered)	wrong	to	
risk	over-punishing,	the	argument	here	says	that	as	soon	as	there	is	reasonable	doubt	about	a	
																																								 																				
19	See,	further,	Alexander	1983.	
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punishment’s	proportionality,	then	we	must	not	punish	beyond	that	level.	Could	this	be	an	
argument	for	abolitionism?	
	
It	could	be,	but	that	would	rely	on	the	validity	of	two	further	claims.	Firstly,	the	position	that	
giving	people	any	punishment	would	be	to	over-punish	them	must	be	a	reasonable	one.	Since	
we	must	only	punish	up	to	the	point	where	there	is	reasonable	doubt	about	the	punishment,	
this	position	only	supports	abolitionism	if	all	punishment	creates	reasonable	doubt.	Therefore,	
the	argument	must	rely	on	abolitionism	being	a	reasonable	position.	As	such,	it	is	not	in	and	
of	itself	an	independent	argument	for	abolitionism,	but	rather	one	that	tells	us	how	a	pre-
existing	reasonable	belief	in	abolitionism	ought	to	figure	in	our	moral	deliberation.	The	
abolitionist	may	have	the	scales	weighted	heavily	in	her	favour	with	this	argument,	but	she	
must	still	make	her	case	on	independent	grounds.	If	our	moral	uncertainty	is	between	whether	
murders	ought	to	be	punished	more	or	less	(but	not	at	all	about	whether	they	ought	to	be	
punished	at	all)	then	the	argument	here	says	we	ought	to	punish	them	less,	not	that	we	ought	
not	to	punish	them.	Uncertainty,	pace	Roebuck	and	Wood,	doesn’t	lead	us	to	no	punishment	
unless	no	punishment	is	(independently)	a	reasonable	option.	
	
But	in	order	for	this	argument	to	lead	us	to	abolitionism,	it	must	also	be	true	that	the	direct	
moral	grounding	of	the	PIP	exists	as	a	principle	and	grounding	external	to	and	not	within	a	
theory	of	punishment	or	criminal	law.	To	explain:	imagine	someone	who	affirms	the	direct	
moral	grounding	as	explaining	the	epistemic	standards	we	need	to	adhere	to	if	we’re	going	to	
have	a	system	of	criminal	law	and	punish	people.	Here	the	PIP	is	a	principle	for	use	within	a	
system	of	punishment,	and	not,	therefore,	a	principle	that	can	be	used	to	question	whether	we	
ought	to	have	such	a	system	at	all.	(After	all,	DMG1	asserts	the	justness	of	punishment).	We	
have	already	decided	to	punish	people,	the	question	is	who	and	how	much.	Another	way	we	
might	hold	the	PIP	is	as	a	fundamental	moral	position	–	if	we	are	going	to	punish	people	at	all	
we	must	be	sure	beyond	reasonable	doubt	that	such	punishment	will	be	appropriate.	Here	the	
PIP	could	challenge	the	notion	of	a	punishment	system,	but	only	if,	as	explained	above,	
abolitionism	is	an	independently	reasonable	position.	
	
Conclusion	
When	people,	whatever	they	believe	the	best	interpretation	of	the	presumption	of	innocence	
(and	its	attendant	high	standard	of	proof)	to	be,	try	to	defend	the	PIP,	they	will	generally	
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reach	for	something	like	Blackstone’s	argument,	or	a	similar	moral	argument	that	focuses	our	
attention	on	the	dreadful	consequences	of	unjust	punishment.	
	
Here,	and	in	previous	work,	I	have	tried	to	show	that,	if	correct,	such	an	argument	has	major	
ramifications	for	how	we	should	behave	and	make	decisions	in	other	areas	of	the	criminal	
justice	process.	It	may	be	that	we	reject	these	ramifications.	But	in	order	to	do	so,	I	think	we	
either	need	to	abandon	our	existing	justifications	of	the	presumption	of	innocence,	or	to	
provide	more	nuanced	versions	of	them.	
	
Even	if	the	argument	does	not	go	through	undiluted,	it	seems	likely	to	me	that	there	is	an	
unjustifiable	cognitive	dissonance	between	the	extreme	lengths	we	go	to	in	order	to	protect	
the	legally	innocent	and	the	comparatively	cavalier	way	in	which	we	make	and	enforce	the	
criminal	law	(Husak	2008,	ch.	1;	Ashworth,	2000).	Furthermore,	the	very	grounds	on	which	we	
affirm	the	procedural	protections	we	endorse	at	trial	can	be	used	to	inform	a	more	careful	
approach	to	legislation	and	sentencing.	
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